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A Gaze Focused on Itself: On the Perception of  Time  
in the Writing of  the History of  the Present 
Zsombor Bódy
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Institute of  Sociology
“Since the past has ceased to throw its light upon the 
future, the mind of  man wanders in obscurity.”
Alexis de Tocqueville: On Democracy in America
Following in the wake of  Reinhart Koselleck’s analyses of  historical time, the study 
examines the contemporary history’s perception of  time. Comparing it with the 
perception of  time in earlier classical periods of  historiography and looking at problems 
of  historical memory, the analysis comes to the conclusion that, in the recent development 
of  historiography and particularly in the writing of  the history of  the present, a new 
presentist perception of  time has become dominant which differs radically from the 
structure of  the perception of  time based on a horizon determined by experience and 
expectation, on which history as an academic discipline was established. Therefore, 
the writing of  the history of  the present is no longer a continuation of  the roughly 
200-year-old story of  history as an academic discipline, but a new practice, whose 
internal characteristics and position among other disciplines which study the society of  
the present from different perspectives (such as sociology, political science, etc.) cannot 
yet be regarded as fully clarified.
Keywords: history of  the present, contemporary history, perception of  historical time, 
memory, Koselleck
Timothy Garton Ash, recalling how he witnessed an event of  the Velvet 
Revolution in Prague, mused that no historian would ever be in a more 
advantageous position than he to report on the events taking place in front of  
him, thus enabling him to acquaint himself  with them directly, in contrast with 
historians who would subsequently try to reconstruct the developments based 
on partial sources.1 Koselleck, on the other hand, demonstrates with a specific 
example that in the early nineteenth century, serious historians rejected a proposal 
to write an extensive work of  history going up to the present. According to the 
counter-arguments, the conditions of  the present were changing too quickly, 
and they were too rudimentary for historians to capture. Furthermore—and this 
1  Ash, „Introduction.” 
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is the essential point—the appropriate perspective for the study of  events was 
lacking and could only be created through the passage of  time.2 The difference 
between the two approaches is obvious. The example cited by Koselleck is 
related to the naissance of  history as a field of  study. The question is whether 
Timothy Garton Ash’s suggestion, representing a contrasting approach, signals 
the end of  the roughly 200-year-old era of  history as an academic discipline. In 
other words: can contemporary history be considered history at all? 
The question might sound surprising at first, as one is aware that there are 
many historians conducting research concerning the history of  the present, 
much as there are many studies of  this area in historical periodicals.3 However, 
many researchers embarking on the study of  the history of  the present have 
encountered uncertainties or crisis symptoms when attempting to identify the 
characteristics and position of  this discipline.4 The writing of  the history of  the 
present seems to be more obviously problematic in Central and Eastern Europe 
than elsewhere.5 The fact that the history of  the present is somehow weak 
compared to the various forms of  memory and non-academic representations 
of  history is shown by the long list of  complaints raised by professional 
historians against the memory market.6 There seems to be an endless supply of  
various forms of  remembrance, and the demand for them is also inexhaustible 
in Central and Eastern European societies.7 Professional histories of  the present 
often seem lost in the flood of  historical memory and popular history.8 Against 
an abundance of  amateurish historical books, historical television programs, 
magazines, traditionalist associations and movements, an abundance of  state-
initiated (or party-initiated) remembrance policy drives, festivals and other 
2  Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft, 335–36.
3  For an overview of  contemporary history by countries see Nützenadel and Schieder, Zeitgeschichte als 
Problem.
4  van Laak, “Zeitgeschichte und populaere Geschichtsschreibung.” According to Nützenadel and Schieder: 
“[es gibt] noch keinen allgemein anerkannten Konsens über die epochale Abgrenzung, thematisches Profil 
und methodische Grundlagen der Zeitgeschichte.” Nützenadel and Schieder, “Einleitende Überlegungen,” 8.
5  See the studies in Apor and Sarkisova, Past for the Eyes.
6  Gérard Noiriel complains that certain institutions of  contemporary history research the history of  
large companies on behalf  of  the corporations, and the companies use the results in their own internal 
training to create loyalty among employees. Obviously, this does not reflect the strength of  the autonomy 
of  science. Noiriel, Sur la “crise” de l’histoire.
7  While in East-Central Europe the political challenges seem to be more severe, in Western Europe 
the economic challenges—or temptations—seem to be dangerous. See: Kühberger and Pudlat, 
Vergangenheitsbewirtschaftung.
8  Korte and Paletschek, Popular History Now and Then.
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programs organized as part of  historical and cultural tourism, the publications 
written by professional historians seem pale and ineffective. Furthermore, they 
reach a far narrower audience.9 Why does history—and in particular the history 
of  the present—sound like a faint voice in the current polyphony of  the study 
and representation of  the recent past? I contend that there are two interrelated 
reasons for the fact that the history of  the present is weak and lacks authority. 
One of  these lies in external (cultural, market-based, and political) challenges 
which have a particularly strong impact on the history of  the present in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The variety of  challenges faced by professional historians 
raises the question of  the status of  memory in contemporary history and other 
questions, such as how testimony puts pressure on other types of  historical 
sources, to what extent historiography as academic practice is counter-memory, 
and how new media have changed the power relations of  memory-related and 
scholarly discourses.10 It would also be worthwhile to analyze methodically 
changes in the position of  professional historiography in the academic and 
cultural/political sphere. I cannot embark on such an enterprise of  the sociology 
of  science here, I would note that in the twentieth century, historiography played 
a role outside of  the academic sphere considerably larger than the role it has 
at the present. Both before 1945 and in the socialist era, in Hungary, people in 
leading positions among professional historians were in many cases influential 
politicians as well. Kúnó Klebelsberg in the 1920s and Erik Molnár in the 1950s 
actually guided the work of  talented young historians as ministers, guiding 
them to pursue various fields of  research which they considered as important. 
This would be inconceivable today. Professional historians were often involved 
in political tasks in the twentieth century, e.g. in areas of  cultural policy and 
undertaking background work for foreign policy during World War II. They also 
determined or at least influenced the topics of  public discourse, and in many 
cases they simply became politicians. One could cite numerous examples of  
this from period of  the 1989/90 change of  regime. Meanwhile, the discourses 
of  history remained strictly academic according to their own norms, and this 
included the exclusion of  texts that did not fulfill the criteria of  the discipline 
from the academic register. Today, in contrast, the borders between historical 
and political discourses seem to be sadly permeable, primarily from the direction 
9  This fact induces many historians to embark on enterprises on the new market create by the demand 
for history. See: Hardtwig and Schug, History sells!
10  These questions are discussed by the studies in Takács, Mémoire, Contre-mémoire, pratique historique. See 
“Présentation” by Takács.
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of  the latter. Politicians play significant roles in the inner world of  academic 
historiography, for example founding new institutions the function of  which is 
to shape the picture of  the past, while historians play hardly any role in politics 
or in the public sphere.11
But beyond these questions of  external challenges, which a reflective history 
of  the present has to face, the main internal reason for the weakness of  the 
writing of  the history of  the present lies in the implicit premises of  history of  
the present, primarily in its perception of  historical time, and in its—actually 
paradoxical—academic self-definition.12 Although the problems of  the history 
of  the present may be particularly obvious in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
political actors have often tried to shape the field of  the history of  the present 
more directly than in other countries, these internal reasons are of  a universal 
nature and not tied to this region.
Looking through the history of  historiography, one finds several key 
paradoxes. In the nineteenth century and even later, for instance, historiography 
considered itself  an objective academic discipline while at the same time it was 
one of  the implements of  the project of  nation-building. These paradoxes can 
actually have a seminal and incentive effect.13 However, the paradox on which 
contemporary history is based leads to a misunderstanding which in the current 
cultural-political constellation makes it ineffective compared to other forms of  
studying and presenting the recent past. This misunderstanding is related to the 
foundations on which the history of  the present wants to build its authority 
outside of  the narrower circle of  professional historians. In this sense, the 
weakness of  contemporary history is not the internal weakness of  scholarly 
production. The history of  the present can undoubtedly boast a number of  
excellent, innovative research projects, and there are productive debates going 
on within the profession, for instance at conferences and in journals. However, 
this research and these debates have a very modest authority, persuasive power, 
11  Looking at the conditions of  contemporary history specifically, János M. Rainer believes that the 
profession is unable to earn more room for maneuver for itself  on its own unless the social and cultural/
political environment changes. Rainer, “…az emlékezet is konfrontálódott a történetírás múltképével ….” 
General overview: Berger, “Professional and popular.”
12  Jaap den Hollander expressed the paradoxical epistemology problem of  contemporary history as 
follows: “Can we describe our own Zeitgeist, or would that amount to a kind of  bootstrapping à la von 
Münchhausen?” Hollander, “Contemporary History,” 52.
13  Berger, The Past as History, 140–224. 
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or transmissibility to a wider audience.14 But the crucial point is quite simply that 
the various players studying and representing the past don’t seem to be willing 
to accept the claim of  professional contemporary history to be the judge of  the 
validity of  knowledge of  the recent past. In certain countries (for example, in 
Germany), professional contemporary historians seem to hold stronger positions, 
but elsewhere, they seem to be as weak as their Central European counterparts. 
In France, according to the diagnosis established by Pierre Nora, history is on 
the brink of  collapse against the flood of  the various forms of  remembrance.15 
Francois Hartog speaks about the impotence of  history replacing the former 
omnipotence of  history.16 We believe that the root of  the problem lies in the 
transformation of  the perception of  historical time, which has removed the 
earlier foundations—a certain structure of  historical temporality—to which 
contemporary history refers, while still defining itself  as part of  history as an 
academic discipline.
Perception of  Time, Scholarly History, and Contemporary History
Contemporary history as a historical discipline is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Nora notes that when he was studying at university, you couldn’t write a 
dissertation on a post-1918 topic.17 Gérard Noiriel said that in England, before 
World War I, no scholarly historical works were written on topics from the 
period after 1837, the year of  the first electoral reform. Historical research 
on the French revolution began in roughly 1889, a century after it broke out. 
Although the concept and era of  contemporary history—which in France still 
actually started with 1789 and in the United Kingdom originally with 1837—has 
existed since the beginning of  the twentieth century, historians initially were 
rather reluctant to write about the present, which has been understood as an 
era the contemporaries of  which are still alive.18  Then, beginning in the 1970s 
14 For a summary of  the problems of  historiography with respect to memory and the political utilization 
of  the past, see Gyáni, “Történelem, vagy csupán emlékezet.” Although Gyáni considers the internal 
changes of  historiography necessary if  it is going to prove able to respond to the challenge of  memory, on 
the whole he remains optimistic with regards to its potentials.
15  Nora: “L’histoire au péril de la politique.” In Nora’s interpretation, the political use of  the past is not 
only associated with politicians, but includes references to the past by civil movements.
16  Hartog, Croire, 29.
17  Nora, L’histoire au péril de la politique. Jaap den Hollander also notes that in the early 1960s, he was not 
taught about the preceding fifty years at school. Hollander, “Contemporary History,” 55.
18  Noiriel, Sur la “crise” de l’histoire, 45–47.
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(although not without some precursory works), research on the present era spread 
very quickly among historians, simultaneously with the rapid expansion of  the 
concept and practices of  historical memory. Today, it is no longer surprising if  
someone writes a historical study about a topic from 20–25 or even only 10 years 
ago.  Memory studies have almost grown into an independent discipline.19 To 
understand the reasons and nature for the emergence of  contemporary history 
and the trend of  memory, we need first to consider why historiography was 
earlier reluctant to approach the study of  the present. 
It is obvious, even on the basis of  only superficial knowledge of  the 
historiographers of  earlier periods, that historians were not always reluctant to 
study contemporary events. On the contrary, as Koselleck, who is admirably 
knowledgeable about the classical authors, demonstrates, historians, from 
Herodotus to the historians of  the eighteenth century, for the most part studied 
the events of  their own eras. This was due primarily to methodological reasons. 
The present was directly accessible, as the historian himself  was an eyewitness 
or at least could rely on eyewitnesses. If  handled with the appropriate caution, 
eyewitness testimony was considered more reliable than fragmented old 
documents, which were easy to forge.20 By the end of  the eighteenth century, a 
contrary approach had taken predominance. As shown by the example cited by 
Koselleck, by then, historiography had become the discipline of  the study of  
the completed past. Of  course, contemporary history continued to exist in the 
nineteenth century, but only as an inferior field of  endeavor in the shadow of  
history as an academic discipline. It was practiced by journalists and publicists, 
who, while wanting to take a position amid the complications of  the present, 
also ventured to make forecasts about the future, in an obviously unscientific 
manner.21 Historiography, which regarded itself  as an academic discipline, 
considered it impossible to study the present.
It was in the spirit of  this (now outdated) perception of  history that Nora, 
the prestigious initiator of  research on historical memory, declared in the 1970s 
that history of  the present does not exist. For him, this is history “sans objet, 
sans statut et sans définition.”22 Nora’s statement cannot be ignored, as it is 
19  Keszei, “Az emlékezet rétegei.” 
20  See Lessing’s famous formula: “Überhaupt aber glaube ich, dass der Name eines wahren 
Geschichtschreibers nur demjenigen zukömmt, der die Geschichte seiner Zeiten und seines Landes 
beschreibt. Denn nur der kann selbst als Zeuge auftreten.” Quoted by Hollander, ibid., 55. 
21 Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft. 335–36.
22  “Tant qu’il n’est d’histoire que du passé, il n’y a pas d’histoire contemporaine. C’est une contradiction 
dans les termes” Nora, “Présent,” 467.
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based on a definition of  historiography that was valid for a long time. Historians 
moved beyond Nora’s objection without considering its real weight, i.e. without 
assessing the change that the emergence of  contemporary history brought by 
disrupting the earlier order of  historiography and the perception of  historical 
time. So far, the epistemology of  contemporary history has hardly been made a 
subject of  methodical study.23
Historians who reflect on and write the history of  the present tend to define 
their discipline as one of  the branches of  historiography, but they must also 
consider their place alongside other disciplines concerned with the study of  the 
present, such as political studies, sociology, and ethnology. Furthermore, they 
must address and at the same time differentiate themselves from non-scientific 
representations of  the recent past, often grouped under the term “memory.”24 
These definitions of  the history of  the present implicitly continue to consider as 
valid the older premises of  historiography, on which history as a discipline was 
established. The strange situation arises because, while the study of  the history 
of  historiography has long historicized these premises, i.e. it has explored their 
origins and analyzed their time-bound operation, whenever these premises are 
not the subject of  study, they are still—half-explained or implicitly—considered 
the foundations of  professional historiography. 25
There is essentially a consensus that the self-definition of  academic, 
professional historiography in the nineteenth century was based on four 
interrelated premises. The most important one was the presumption of  the 
reality of  history as a linear process in time which can be scientifically examined. 
The second one was the presumption of  a dividing line between past and 
present. The concept of  the fundamental difference between past and present 
was based on the linear perception of  time, in which development—or at least 
change—makes the earlier conditions obsolete and creates a different present, 
which in turn is open towards a future as yet unknown. From the perspective 
of  the present, the past—since it has already passed—can only be understood 
through a methodical processing of  the sources remaining from earlier times. 
The third was the assumption that there is a methodology which enables the 
historian to bridge the distance between present and past by deciphering the 
sources originating in the past. The fourth premise was that historiography was 
23  According to Jaap den Hollander “the theoretical status of  contemporary history [is] enigmatic” and 
“deserves more theoretical reflection than it has received up to now.” Ibid., 51–52.
24  Metzler, “Zeitgeschichte.”
25  Iggers, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft. Koselleck, Vergange Zukunft.
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born as a national science, and this premise provided a fundamental frame of  
reference or range of  interpretation for the findings of  historians.26 
Of  these premises, the first and the second are obviously the most interesting 
from the point of  view of  the perception of  the history of  the present. We know 
from Koselleck’s analysis of  the space of  experience and expectation that the 
“temporalization” of  history took place around the turn of  the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. This created a perception of  past, present, and future that 
made it possible to look at historical time in a linear perspective. It also created the 
possibility of  the idea of  progress; as expectations for the future were based on the 
conviction that the future can be different, the future has to be different to what has 
been experienced in the past. However, from the point of  view of  this discussion, 
the way in which this influences historical cognition is more important.27 The idea 
that events appear different to historians from different perspectives has been 
well-known since the sixteenth century. Now, the idea of  perspective has gained a 
temporal dimension. A theory and practice of  historical cognition has been created 
in which temporal distance is a decisive factor, which makes cognition possible.28 
This was only possible if  historiography placed itself  at least partly outside of  
history, or rather at a point beyond the past. Assuming a gap between past and 
present—the second premise—ensured that the past subjects of  study had an 
existence independent from the present. Phases of  history which were already 
completed could exist as external objects for the historian’s scrutinizing gaze in 
the present. The distance between the historian’s present and the fundamentally 
different past was required for the historian’s methodology to work.
It followed from the fundamental difference between past and present 
as perceived by historiography that the future was also open to change. The 
present, as the past future of  an earlier period, was also unforeseeable once, just 
as it is impossible to predict the future from the present. This belief  in historical 
change, in which the horizon of  expectations for the future was put at a distance 
from the space of  experience, was lacking from the earlier perception of  time, 
which did not expect the ongoing events to bring qualitative changes into the 
26  On the foundations of  historiography see Hölscher, Die Entdeckung der Zukunft, 9–10, and Etzemüller, 
“Ich sehe das, was Du nicht siehst.” On the nation as a frame of  reference see Berger, The Past as History.
27  “Die Lehre von der geschichtlichen Perspektiven legitimiert den historischen Erkenntniswandel, 
indem sie der Zeitfolge eine erkenntisstiftende Funktion zuweist. Geschichtliche Wahrheiten wurden kraft 
ihrer Verzeitlichung zu überlegenen Wahrheiten.” Koselleck, Vergange Zukunft, 336.
28  In the words of  Michel de Certeau, time has become object and measurement tool at the same time 
for historians. de Certeau, Histoire et psychanalyse, 89.
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world of  people and things.29 Only at the end of  the eighteenth century, as 
people started to experience the present as radically different from their earlier 
experiences and had expectations for a future that would be different from the 
present, could historiography emerge as a discipline of  change, which studied 
the completed past, which was therefore unalterable, dividing it into periods and 
interpreting it from a perspective of  the present that was external to the past. 
This historiography could not embark on a historical analysis of  the present, as 
its gaze was only suitable for the study of  the completed past.30 As Arthur C. 
Danto expressed, especially in response to the complaint that historians couldn’t 
experience the events they are studying, “the whole point of  history is not to 
know about actions as witnesses might, but as historians do, in connection with 
later events and as parts of  temporal wholes.”31  
However, in the emergence of  historiography, it was not only the 
relationship between past and present that mattered from the triple structure 
of  past, present, and future. Expectations for the future made the evolution 
of  historiography possible not simply because without them the dissimilarity 
between past and present would have been inconceivable. The study of  the 
past was not independent from the horizon of  expectations, because the gaze 
of  the historian studying the past was directed by expectations concerning the 
future. This is not to say that expectations for the future were always fulfilled, 
in fact, they were rarely met, nevertheless, according to Koselleck, the horizon 
of  the future still contributed to determining the present and thereby also to 
determining what event of  the past seemed worthy of  study to the historian 
in the present. However, the future was capable of  orienting the historian’s 
work not as a general future, but as the future of  something, specifically of  the 
community to which the historian belonged and whose past he was researching. 
The concept of  history would have been inconceivable without the subject of  
history, and it was most often the nation which had a history. If  the historian’s 
gaze had a wider scope, then it was the history of  the West.32
The practice of  contemporary history, I contend, is not based on the 
four abovementioned premises of  classical historiography or the triple time 
structure of  past, present, and future. Its emergence—along with the memory 
boom—means precisely that this time perception and these premises have 
29  See for example Danto’s analyses of  Thucydides’ perception of  time, Analytical Philosophy, 22–23.
30  See Etzemüller op. cit. and Jung: “Das Neue der Neuzeit ist ihre Zeit.”
31  Danto, Analytical Philosophy, 183. 
32  Berger, “Introduction.”
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become outdated. It is therefore possible, however, that history of  the present 
misunderstands itself  when it perceives itself  as a subdiscipline of  history and 
places its own activity in the line of  the history writing founded in the early 
eighteenth century. The emergence of  contemporary history “in a sense ... 
meant a rehabilitation of  the tradition from before 1800.” 33
From this point of  view, it is questionable, whether the old historiography 
itself, in which history was based on the connection between the space of  
experience and the horizon of  expectation described by Koselleck, has by now 
lost some of  its persuasive power. Has it not become increasingly meaningless 
for today’s audiences because the validity of  the perception of  time on which it 
was based has become highly questionable? Even more questionable—and this 
is the focus of  this discussion—is whether the history of  the present was ever 
related to the earlier triple time structure which served as the foundation for 
historiography.
This question is important in the cultural landscape of  today, because several 
defenders of  history criticize—in the name of  contemporary history, which they 
still perceive as part of  classical historiography—the unprofessional treatment of  
history, and they continue to attempt to create the legitimate foundations of  this 
criticism by citing their own methodical procedures. On the part of  professional 
historians, the lack of  appropriate methodology remains the most important 
criticism of  unprofessional historical representations. Unprofessional museum 
displays, monuments which evoke the wrong context, distorting documentaries, 
pathetic ceremonial speeches which draw their expressive force from references 
to (what is alleged to be) history, and weak historical novels are all criticized 
for lacking the methodology to create an appropriate context for the recalled 
elements of  the past.34 But is this an effective way of  defending professional 
history against the challenges of  non-professional uses of  the past? On what is 
this defense based, when the foundations of  the methodology (which is based 
on the perception of  time and which once made professional historiography 
able to interpret the phenomena of  the past) are also questionable or, rather, 
according to several diagnoses, have become history and belong to the past? 
The rise of  memory and the more recent studies of  historiography make this 
question unavoidable. 
33  “[C]ontemporary History finally became an academic subdiscipline, complete with its own chairs, 
journals, and research institutes. In a sense, this meant a rehabilitation of  the tradition from before 1800.” 
Hollander, “Contemporary History,” 55.
34  For example, Apor, “Hitelesség és hitetlenség.”
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The Expansion of  the Memory Market and the Reactions of  Historians
It is worth dwelling on the issue of  the trend of  memory for a while because 
it is one of  the phenomena which shows how the classical concept of  history 
has become questionable. There have been numerous studies of  the evolution 
of  the concepts of  historical memory—and historical heritage—and the related 
phenomena, which spread particularly beginning with the end of  the 1970s, 
and they are usually considered a kind of  phenomenon of  crisis.35 There are 
also numerous analyses describing the trend of  remembrance using images of  
disease, abuse, and natural disasters, such as flooding. These analyses definitely 
tend to characterize the increased demand for historical memory as a danger for 
professional history, or they consider it one result of  the crisis of  professional 
historiography.36 This is a very old contrast; Halbwachs, one of  the founders 
of  memory studies, contrasted history with memory, primarily based on their 
different relationship to time. The latter is always related to the living human 
community, while the former stands outside of  all possible communities, and 
its job is not to remember, but to analyze.37 Memory maintains an experience 
of  time through which the remembering community lived, while the historian’s 
task, according to Halbwachs, is to reconstruct the temporality of  the past, 
which is independent from any experienced time and from the present as well. 
Halbwachs believes that if  the historian strays into the territory of  memory, 
he will cease to be a historian.38 Thus, the conflict between historiography and 
memory was already expressed in the first analyses between the two world wars, 
and the problem was rediscovered again around the turn of  the millennium. 
Historiography fundamentally responded in two ways to the memory boom. 
It either entered the memory market, widening its audience and, naturally, giving 
its activity a slightly new direction, or it adopted a defensive position. The 
negative position underlined the fact that the questions of  history writing are not 
35  On heritage, see Sonkoly, Bolyhos tájaink, 17–33. On heritage in Central Europe, see Erdősi and 
Sonkoly, “Levels of  National Heritage Building.”
36  Gyáni, “Történelem, vagy csupán emlékezet” ; Rainer, “…az emlékezet is konfrontálódott a 
történetírás múltképével…”; K. Horváth, Az emlékezet betegei; Todorov, Les abus de la mémoire ; Revel, “Le 
fardeau de la mémoire.” 
37  According to Pierre Nora, the turnaround whereby historiography abandoned its functions of  
memory and assumed a critical function—basically associated with the emergence of  the Annales school—
took place precisely during the period when Halbwachs’s analyses concerning memory were being written. 
Nora, “Pour une histoire contemporaine.”
38  Halbwachs, La mémoire collective, 122–35.
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asked by politicians, communities expressing their own needs of  remembrance, 
or the media. If  historians settle for positions as servants of  the memory 
market, this might well compel them to abandon their academic principles, even 
though they appear to gain in terms of  the size of  their audiences and access to 
research funding. These views, which are critical of  memory, criticize forms of  
remembrance—such as expositions, rites, memorials, texts, etc.—which seem 
inaccurate and unreliable from the point of  view of  academic historiography. 
There are numerous negative reactions of  this kind, representing different 
attitudes, but similarly conservative in their approach to history as an academic 
discipline.39 Péter Apor very clearly pointed out certain characteristics of  the 
concept and cult of  memory from the theoretical point of  view. He highlighted 
the tendency of  memory studies to lead often to a circulus vitiosus. According 
to the general approach borrowed primarily from anthropology, the identity 
of  a community is determined by its collective memory, while memory in turn 
depends on identity itself.40 Other authors—in accordance with Nora—consider 
academic historiography merely a kind of  remembrance,41 which, under given 
cultural constellations which are in the process of  vanishing, enjoyed a leading 
role for a while in shaping the image of  the past. From this point of  view, the 
vanishing of  the conceptual foundations of  classical historiography is not a loss 
from the perspective of  our understanding of  the past. Apor, however, disagrees 
with the idea that any form of  memory could represent a more authentic 
relationship to the past than historiography based on analysis, methodical source 
criticism, and rational evidence, and he emphasizes that the questions addressed 
in the historiography do not originate directly in the needs of  social communities 
or contemporaries’ interpretations of  past experiences. He continues to insist on 
the scholarly ideals of  source criticism, rational verification, and the interpretation 
of  documents in the correct context, which would not retain a secure position in 
historiography considered as a form of  social memory.42 
39  Romsics, “Új tendenciák” ; idem, A múlt arcai; Apor, “Hitelesség és hitetlenség.”
40  Ibid., 164–66.
41  Burke, Varieties of  Cultural History, 40–59.
42  Apor wants to enforce the evidence-based methodology supported by rational source criticism, on 
the basis of  which historiography can judge the authenticity of  representations of  the past falling in the 
category of  non-academic historiography. Apor, “Hitelesség és hitetlenség.” But from the point of  view 
of  the sociology of  knowledge, we can state that there is no rationality or epistemology independent 
from space and time. The earlier scientific point of  view did not come into being in a vacuum; it is not an 
embodiment of  an abstract rationality. So, the validity of  this epistemology may not be considered as self-
evident in other historical situations than the one in which it was born.
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Placing emphasis on the latter scientific approach to history, which 
assigns a critical role to historiography based on the procedures of  traditional 
methodology, proves ineffective in itself  against the demands of  memory. As 
Gábor Gyáni points out, source criticism and other scholarly procedures are 
not sufficient assurances of  authenticity. For our knowledge of  the past to 
be valid, the present must be able to accept it as its own knowledge, which 
means that it must meet demands from outside the professional community.43 
The space in which the voice of  professional contemporary history needs to 
assert itself  and the knowledge generated by historiography needs to have itself  
accepted as authentic is constituted by representations of  what is known as 
experiences of  historical agency and the discursive practices related to the past 
maintained by the multiplayer memory market.44 The contemporary history 
of  eyewitnesses and memory takes no interest in the premises and lacks the 
perception of  time on which academic historiography is based.45 This presents 
a challenge to contemporary history, which cannot be surmounted simply with 
insistence on the academic conception of  history. But it is also not clear whether 
contemporary history resting on scholarly foundations moves in the dynamics 
of  past, present, and future, in which professional history once moved, or this 
time structure has lost its validity even in professional contemporary history. If  
so, the classical perception of  time and the methodology on which it is based 
no longer provide a reliable foundation for historical knowledge, in which case 
one may well ask why the historical methodology would ensure a base for the 
defense of  professional history against the memory market.
Has the Past Come to an End?
Renowned historians and thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Reinhard Koselleck, 
and Francois Hartog have all diagnosed a fracture in historical time and time 
perception. In a study analyzing the relationship between past and present, 
Arendt made the following statement about the loss of  the continuity of  
historical time: “[W]ithout tradition—which selects and names, which hands 
down and preserves, which indicates where the treasures are and what their 
worth is—there seems to be no willed continuity in time and hence, humanly 
speaking, neither past nor future, only sempiternal change of  the world and 
43  Gyáni, “Miről szól a történelem?.”
44  Frank, Der Mauer um die Wette gedenken.
45  Wieviorka, L’ere du témoin.
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the biological cycle  of  living creatures in it.”46 Her statements made an impact 
among historians several decades later, after Koselleck’s works drew attention to 
the time structures on which historiography is based. On the basis of  Koselleck’s 
initiative, Francois Hartog embarked on an exploration of  the various orders 
of  historical temporality (regimes d’historicité). Researching the history of  
experience and expectation horizons—although the scope of  his inquiry 
extended over more distant ages and geographical areas as well—he primarily 
explored the changes which took place in the perception of  historical time in 
the twentieth century. Hartog concludes that as long as the relationship between 
the horizons of  experience and expectations is maintained through the present 
by the subjects of  history possessing an identity, and thus what could be seen 
from the past was what the future of  the “nation”, “society”, “country”, or “the 
West” (or possibly the “proletariat” or the “race”) threw its light upon, there was 
a space for historiography. Although expectations for the future rarely shaped 
the future efficiently—and then mostly only as self-fulfilling prophecies—still 
they substantially contributed to shaping the intellectual/cultural landscape of  
the present and thereby to the study of  the past as well. However, by the last 
decades of  the twentieth century, the horizons of  experience and expectation 
permanently began to diverge, eliminating the time structure which constituted 
the conditions for historiography. Hartog says this resulted in an expanded, 
eternal, and directionless present, which has nothing to do with the past and 
is not clearly oriented towards any future.47 We might add to this—and Hartog 
does not emphasize this—that at the same time the categories which earlier had 
functioned as the subjects of  history have also disintegrated. If  today we want 
to examine the past of  the “nation” or the “West” or the “working class” or 
the “bourgeoisie,” we keep running into question marks: what is it we want to 
examine? These categories have been broken down by historical analysis, and 
their constructed nature has been exposed by conceptual history studies. Thus, 
if  somebody wants to look into his or her future, all one can see on the horizon 
is obscurity, as the existence of  these concepts has also become questionable 
in a constructivist approach. Historiography has often shown that they are 
unsuitable as a framework for analyses, and historiography has tended first to 
transcend the history of  any nation by allegedly crafting a European history or 
a transnational history, and then to transcend European histories by narrating 
46  Arendt, “The Gap Between Past and Future,” 5.
47  Hartog, Régimes d’historicité.
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global histories.48 The often-cited disintegration of  the “grand narratives” 
actually results from the disintegration of  their subjects as the actors of  history. 
At the very least, the “nation,” “society,” and various social groups (and more 
recently the frequently mentioned “West” itself) no longer function as subjects 
which could organize historical narratives and secure the unity of  historical time 
through their existence, pointing from the past towards the future.49
This disintegration of  the subjects of  history and of  historical time is 
partly the result of  historiography itself. It has become clear partly from the 
works of  Foucault that historical cognition has become an activity, in which 
research on the origins of  phenomena destroys the picture of  a uniform past.50 
Genealogy—the method of  understanding which approaches phenomena in 
their historical aspects, by exploring their origins—exposes as false the origin 
stories on which the existence of  the subjects of  history is based, and thereby the 
“grand narratives” of  which they were the subjects also fall apart.51 Earlier, this 
genealogical approach as historical method of  understanding did not necessarily 
involve the disintegration of  uniform history. Exposing certain origin stories 
served precisely to allow the events of  genuinely foundational importance to 
stand clear or to create opportunities for new foundations. However, these 
applications of  genealogy definitely had some kind of  vision and expectation 
horizon.52 Only after the horizon of  the future became obscure in recent decades 
48  Buruma and Margalit, Occidentalism. 
49  As K. Horváth points out, just as Hartog, Niklas Luhman also emphasizes, there can be no continuity 
or even chronology without identity. K. Horváth, “Betegségek, pszichopatológiák és időstruktúrák.” On 
the end of  the “grand narratives,” see: Takács, “A történelem vége.”
50  Bódy, “Michel Foucault: A szexualitás története.” Burke said that in foundation myths, unintended 
consequences of  past actions are considered conscious aims of  the one-time actors. It is the duty of  
historiography to destroy these myths and thereby to remind us of  the fragmented nature of  history. 
Burke’s examples are Durkheim and Weber, as the founders of  sociology, and Luther, as the father of  
Reformation. Burke, Varieties of  Cultural History, 58–59. Thus, according to Burke, historiography in a 
critical sense will itself  perform a remembrance function, although what constitutes the foundation for this 
remains unexplained in Burke’s works.
51  Ádám Takács pointed out that it is not history that ends with the end of  the “grand narratives,” but 
only the more or less clearly outlined social/political alternatives. Takács, “A történelem vége.” Translating 
this into Kosellecki’s terminology, we could say that it was these alternatives that were earlier outlined on 
the horizon of  expectation, and historical time was moving in their direction.
52  As Schwendtner shows, even the Nietzschean genealogy had an orientation towards the future in 
this sense. It analyzed what originated from the past precisely in order to open a path towards the future. 
It is even more true of  the genealogy perception of  Husserl and Heidegger that they also aimed to lay 
the foundations for new identities or recreate the foundations of  old ones, and at the same time to exit 
the present and create new, future opportunities by examining past events that were of  foundational 
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did it begin to seem—not independently of  the impact of  Foucault’s works, 
but as a consequence of  probably far broader changes—that no genealogy is 
possible other than the kind that destroys uniform history, and only then did 
it begin to seem that, at the same time, the continuity and unity of  historical 
time also cease to exist. Efforts to reinstate history into its earlier position and 
recreate the dynamic space of  experience and expectations, in which historical 
time can again move from the past towards the future, are therefore seeking 
categories which could help transcend the postmodern state and create “grand 
narratives” again.53 However, it is not obvious that it is possible to recreate a 
teleological history or to have some kind of  philosophy of  history generally 
accepted. Teleology cannot be established intentionally, i.e. with the intention 
of  creating teleology. The last such theories relating to the end of  history—
late reflections of  Hegel’s philosophy of  history—were spectacularly short of  
persuasive power. Fukuyama’s concept seems to want to rescue the West as the 
subject of  history by stopping historical time. If  history comes to an end, the 
West remains unchanged, and its identity is no longer questionable.54 It is not in 
this sense that the often-diagnosed predominance of  the present means the end 
of  history. Instead, it delegitimizes and even eliminates the idea of  history so far, 
rather than completing the process of  history. We could say that the expansion 
of  the present puts an end not to history, but to the past. More precisely, it 
dissolves the past in the present.55
Consequences: Contemporary History in the Present
In light of  this evolution of  present-centeredness, the rise of  contemporary 
history is an entirely logical development; in fact, it is an adequate response from 
historiography to the changes in historical time structures. After all, amid the 
importance from the perspective of  the present—while thereby relativizing their own present. Foundation 
or connecting with foundations were definitely considered possible. Schwendtner, Eljövendő múlt.
53  Baschet, “L’histoire face au présent perpétuel.”
54  Fukuyama, The End of  History. 
55  One could say that from this point of  view that all of  the past has been dissolved in the present 
and thus the problem of  historical distance does not exist and never existed. “The past only ever appears 
in our present beliefs; it is never given at a distance,” Mark Bevir confidently declares, as if  he thereby 
transcended earlier errors related to this. Bevir, “Why historical distance is not a problem,” 25. Bevir here 
does not acknowledge the fact that the idea of  a past independent from the present was at least as real in 
the beliefs of  the one-time presents, as real as today’s post-foundational ideas. See Gumbrecht’s analyses of  
the “chronotopes” and, among them, a description of  the “historicist” chronotope, which lost its validity 
around the 1970s to give place to our broad present. Gumbrecht, Unsere breite Gegenwart. 
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fading of  historical time, it is increasingly difficult to write about the history of  
earlier periods in a manner that allows narratives of  the past to be interpreted 
in the light of  the present or in a way that suggests that past phenomena throw 
light on the present. The growing interest in the contemporary is shown by the 
fact that H-Net, a central website for the humanities and social sciences, offers 
6,811 findings for the search expression “medieval,” which was once the main 
territory of  historical research, in contrast with the 22,365 search results for 
“contemporary.”56 In fact, it is the legitimacy of  the history writing of  earlier 
periods that is gradually being called into question.57 More precisely, outside 
of  professional circles, events of  earlier periods can only be interpreted as 
exampla for the present—not as part of  a continuity—in the sense described 
by Koselleck as the operation of  the “Historia est magistra vitae” principle, 
which was eliminated precisely by the emergence of  academic historiography at 
the turn of  the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.58 We can see traces of  the 
return of  the exemplum whenever present phenomena are interpreted through 
past events without the existence of  any causal relationship or more distant, but 
content-based connection between the two. The past is often recalled in this 
manner in politicians’ speeches and newspaper articles in order to throw light on 
current processes, from global politics to local events. 
Thus, amid this present-centeredness, it is no wonder that many historians 
turn towards the study of  the present, where the legitimacy, meaningfulness, 
and importance of  research topics is not called into question, and which also 
meets with far more interest among far wider audiences. However, the present-
centeredness of  contemporary history means that most of  the premises 
defining historiography in the classical way fail in this case. The necessity of  
the historical methodology is not self-evident, because there are other ways to 
access the recent past. If  one still wishes to apply the historical method, this 
requires special explanation, because—unlike in the case of  earlier periods—
the historical methodology is only one of  several possible alternatives. But 
perhaps most importantly, the classical modern concept of  history, in which 
past, present, and future were simultaneously connected and separated by the 
56  While for the search expression “middle age,” 1,671 items appear on the web-site H-Net, the search 
term “contemporary history” yielded 2,577 findings, and in addition, one can find another 246 items 
for “present time.” The French expression “moyen age” yields only 104 results, while the French world 
“contemporain” yields 420. (These searches were done on May 15, 2017.)
57  Hochmut stated, for example, that “Public History in den Berliner Museen ist vor allem Public 
Contemporary History.“ Hochmut, “HisTourismus” 177.
58  Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft.
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linear flow of  time, has become empty and lost its meaning. Once the notion 
has gained currency that the existence of  a history in this sense is a question 
of  belief, this history ceases to be a certainty.59 The place of  the past as a linear 
process, which can be observed from the present and scientifically analyzed 
and understood, has been taken, as is well known, by the concepts of  memory 
and heritage. The dominance of  the concepts of  memory and heritage means 
that rather than analyzing—based on historical methodology—the process of  
historical time considered as real, the past is becoming only accessible for the 
present as heritage or through memory. Hence, one must be faithful to heritage 
and preserve memory.60
Modern historiography was born in a somewhat autonomous system of  
academic institutions in the sociological sense, which was also the medium 
upholding the system of  rules on the basis of  which a specialist work is classified 
as good or bad. In the classical period of  historiography, historiography was 
connected to non-academic spheres by the teleological approach and the 
national frame of  reference, which also shared these ideas. Today, this is no 
longer the case. Nation as a frame of  reference does not work consensually. 
Nowadays, though history exists within autonomous academic institutions 
which function on the basis of  certain professional rules, the communication 
between the historical profession and the broader public sphere is hindered not 
only by the fact that, outside of  this medium, the rules governing the sciences 
do not apply, but also by the absence of  a commonly shared teleological 
approach or national thinking. This should not be misunderstood as an appeal 
to bring nation back in the form that in which it used to operate, nor indeed 
would this be possible. Furthermore, historians cannot artificially create a new 
teleology, which would go from the past to the future through the present. 
The potential subjects of  such a history (not only the “nation” but also the 
“West” as subjects of  history) were also deconstructed with the emergence 
of  a transnational global history.61 Hence, it is no use wishing for a return of  
59  So believes Francois Hartog, who thinks that for our current thinking, only the ever-wandering 
present remains, and the past can only be interpreted as recollection and heritage, rather than as history. 
Hartog, Croire en l’histoire, 281–82.
60  Lowenthal, The Heritage Crusade, 1–30.
61  On the website H-Net, the expression “global History” yields 2,415 items and “transnational history” 
yields 1,449. These two numbers indicate the popularity of  these research fields. (These searches were done 
on May 15, 2017.) However, transfers, interactions, networking, and other key concepts of  transnational 
history are not suitable as historical subjects, or at least not as subjects with which readers can identify. 
Wehler, “Transnational Geschichte”; Conrad, What is Global History, 185–203. 
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the earlier methods of  cognition in the absence of  the foundations and wider 
intellectual framework on which they were based. Thus, using an argument drawn 
from the sociology of  knowledge, we can say in this case that what was classified 
as rational methodology—proposed for example by Apor62—within the earlier 
framework and of  classical historiography has lost its foundations and, hence, 
its persuasive power. As can be seen, alternative approaches are highly attractive.
So, historiography is only one of  several possible alternative approaches to 
the study of  the present, and the application of  its methods is no longer self-
evident. But furthermore, its tools do not seem strong compared to those of  
its competitors. Why would there be any need for the use of  historical methods 
in connection with a period for which the issue is not the interpretation of  the 
remaining sources, but what eyewitnesses can remember of  it? The sources are 
not part of  a remote past, which is only accessible through the use of  special 
methods. Rather, they have meanings which are considered self-evident for 
people living today. Why should professional historians—practitioners of  a 
specific methodology—alone be competent as interpreters of  the history of  
the present, when this present (or at least the sources to which it has given 
rise) is still accessible in our everyday culture?63 It is obviously impossible to 
understand events or processes which took place two hundred years ago without 
special preliminary training. This is basically accepted by everyone interested 
in history as non-professionals. This is the consequence of  the principle of  
the historical perspectivity, on which historiography was based. However, 
in connection with periods from which there are still living eyewitnesses or 
which still have a living collective memory, this is not self-evident. Of  course, 
professional history possesses an analytical force compared to everyday thinking. 
But anthropology, fictional literature, films, journalistic works, exhibitions, 
etc. can be just as competent as interpretations of  various phenomena of  the 
present as historiography. Literary works such as Péter Esterházy’s Harmonia 
Caelestis (Celestial Harmonies, available in English translation by Judith Sollosy) and 
Javított kiadás (“Revised Edition”) are arguably important works in Hungary for 
readers interested in the socialist era, even though by genre they are novels. One 
could also mention Péter Nádas’s Egy családregény vége (The End of  a Family Story, 
62  Apor, “Hitelesség és hitetlenség.”
63  This is also essentially the direction in which the arguments of  Timothy Garton Ash point when 
he questions the privilege of  professional historiography in researching the history of  the present and 
undertakes to defend his own journalistic methods and writing. Ash, “Introduction.”
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available in English translation by Imre Goldstein), not to mention numerous 
other authors of  works of  fiction of  lower quality but some significance. 
As a consequence of  the absence of  the earlier dynamics of  past, present, 
and future from the study of  contemporary history, the history of  the present 
stands in many ways closer to literary fiction or film on the one hand and, on the 
other, to other contemporary studies than it does to the historiography which 
is focused on earlier periods.64 Of  the contemporary disciplines, it is currently 
obviously closest to anthropology, although, in theory, it could well move closer 
to sociology or political science, but for the moment there are no signs of  this. 
In any event, the history of  the present thus communicates more with other 
ways of  thinking directed at the recent past than it does with the historiography 
of  earlier periods. This is reflected, for instance, by the extent to which many 
historians of  the present are unable or unwilling to connect the phenomena they 
are studying with events preceding them in time, and they hesitate to place them 
into context as part of  a longer (for example, mid-term) continuity. This mainly 
happens in the culturalist versions of  histories of  the present. In Hungary, there 
are hardly any historians who research both periods before and after 1945, and it 
may well be true that in most Central and Eastern European countries historians 
are split into two distinct groups, those studying eras before 1945 and those 
pursuing research on the post-1945 era, without knowing much more than the 
educated non-professional about earlier periods.65
Of  course, the history of  the present is a meaningful intellectual activity, 
which can apply various cultural techniques, but it seems questionable how 
much it is indeed a continuation of  historiography when the premises which 
once defined historiography are now lacking. At the same time, of  course, the 
history of  the present can be pursued well or badly. But the difference between 
a good work of  history on the present or a good exhibition on the history of  
the present and a bad one does not necessarily lie in the fact that one applies 
the scientific methodology of  historiography well and the other one does not. 
Nobody would argue with Esterházy in the name of  scientific rigor about the 
fate of  the aristocracy after 1945 or the work of  the secret service of  the party 
state as portrayed in his literary account of  his father’s activity as an agent. His 
64  See for example the Sándor Horváths’ work Feljelentés, which offers a detailed historical account of  the 
life of  a totally insignificant agent of  the Hungarian political police, which throws more light on the history 
of  the state socialism than any analyses of  the social and political structure of  the era.
65  The problem is diagnosed and the need to examine continuities across the boundary of  1945 is 
suggested by Bódy and Horváth, “1945 és a háború társadalma,” 7–12.
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novel and similar fictional accounts are very good books of  their own kind. A 
historian of  the present can enter into a dialogue with these works precisely 
because—although they are specifically not works of  historiography—they are 
intellectual efforts directed at the same object with which the historian is dealing. 
However, if  the historian of  the present does not criticize good writers from the 
point of  view of  science, then bad writers and poor museum exhibitions should 
not be criticized from a so-called scientific point of  view either.
It follows from this that the criticism by good historians of  the present of  
poor representations of  memory, poor museologists, and the designers of  bad 
monuments should not be legitimized with the academic authority of  historiography. 
Calls for adequate source criticism or appropriate contextualization, which cite the 
old methodology of  historiography, are ineffective in themselves. Contemporary 
history cannot successfully defend itself  against these challenges in this manner. 
In spite of  its internal colorfulness, the voice of  contemporary history is lost in 
the polyphony of  other contemporary studies, the memory market, and political 
uses of  the past because it tries to base its position and authority on something 
which one can hardly expect to be appreciated in the present-centered present. In 
this sense, the history of  the present may not be what it claims to be. However 
assiduously it applies new concepts (for instance transnationality, which has been 
prominent in the past two decades), it often makes no impact on other contemporary 
studies or the wider public, and it is often unable to connect with the demand for 
forms of  remembrance. Thus, in the current intellectual sphere, historians of  the 
present are not in the same privileged position as historians dealing with earlier 
periods which are clearly divided from the present. They argue in vain that they are 
more competent than others thanks to their use of  a historical methodology. The 
historical perspective, which legitimizes the historical methodology in research on 
the earlier past, does not provide a solid base for research which is focused on the 
present, and it definitely does not provide a position of  authority which would 
give historiography a special role among other forms of  reflection directed at the 
present.66 Thus, in the absence of  the dynamics of  time, the history of  the present 
is in fact based on the paradox of  the gaze looking at itself, which makes it weak 
compared to other approaches to the study of  the present, which do not draw 
their analytical power from the temporal perspective. This paradox also leaves the 
history of  the present devoid of  tools in comparison with remembrance, from 
66  Nora believes that the historian’s function regarding the present time is ground down against journalism 
and contemporary studies such as sociology, anthropology, economics, and geography.  Nora, “Présent,” 471.
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which it does not effectively differ, since, through the latter, the person who 
remembers can also project himself  into the events recalled.
Historians of  the present who are doing a good job from the intellectual point 
of  view should reflect on what their activity comprises and the foundations on 
which it is based. They should also consider the criteria on which any distinction 
between good and bad history of  the present could be made, or between a good 
exhibition or historical monument and a bad one. They should work out the 
foundations on the basis of  which contemporary history communicates with 
other academic and non-academic forms of  understanding the present, and they 
should also reflect on and articulate the premises on which they base assertions 
of  the validity of  their own procedures. According to Nora’s proposition, the 
first step in this direction should be to acknowledge that contemporary history 
is not a temporal appendix at the end of  the long process of  history. In fact, 
it is not even history. More precisely, he believes it is a history which differs 
from the notion of  history as it is normally understood (a means of  seizing 
an understanding of  earlier periods).67 History as a discipline established on 
the basis of  a linear notion of  time was based precisely on the exclusion of  
the present.68 Thus, the history of  the present can only be constructed on 
foundations which differ from those of  classical historiography, and which give 
rise to different rules. This construction would be necessary to provide effective 
protection against a flood of  low-quality works and against the memory market, 
where according to the dominant view everyone has his or her own memory and 
his or her own history, which is immune to criticism, if  one relies solely on the 
old rules of  historiography. This is why it would be urgent to find a definition 
of  a history of  the present which preserves the values of  historiography upheld 
by the professional community and still holds meaning for non-historians, i.e. 
is still able to communicate—on the basis of  some kind of  new foundations—
with other social spheres. Of  course, the question Nora asked forty years ago 
concerning the historians of  the future who will write on their present remains 
open: “Mais faut-il encore l’appeler historien?”69
67  “[L]’histoire contemporaine … n’est pas le simple appendice temporel d’une histoire sure d’elle-meme, 
mais un histoire autre et que l’exclusion du contemporain hors du champ de l’histoire est précisément ce qui 
lui donne sa spécificité.” Ibid., 467.
68  Ibid.
69  Nora, “Présent,”472.
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